➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Professor Greg I. Anyanwu V. University of Jos (CA/J/43/2010 · 26 February 2014)
by Branham Chima (LL.B.)
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Cause of action;
Statute bar.
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
This is an appeal against the Ruling of the Federal High Court, Jos, presided over by Stephen Adah (J) in suit No. FHC/J/CS/3/2008, delivered on the 8th day of July, 2008, wherein the Appellant’s case was dismissed by the learned trial Court for being statute barred. In a reserved judgment, the learned trial Judge held inter-alia thus: “It follows therefore that the Plaintiff who slept on his right and woke up to approach this Court well after the period prescribed by the law has elapsed is left with a bare, empty cause of action which is unenforceable as a result of the said lapses. I hold therefore that this suit is totally barred. It is accordingly dismissed.”
Dissatisfied with the decision of the learned trial Judge, the Appellant approached this Court and filed a notice of appeal consisting of two grounds.
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether the trial court was right in dismissing the Appellant’s suit based on grounds of statute bar (sic) as raised in the Respondent’s preliminary objection?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL ALLOWED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN APPELLANT’S FAVOUR.
[TIME CAN ONLY BEGIN TO RUN AGAINST THE APPELLANT AFTER THE EXHAUSTION OF THE LOCAL REMEDY OF THE UNIVERSITY
‘Having stated the law and all that as it relates to statute barred actions it would not be out of place to examine what transpired in the court below that brought about the extant appeal under consideration. Put differently, is the action of the Appellant statute Barred? A cursory look at the admitted averments in the statement of claim, it is not in dispute that; (a) After the Respondent’s letter of the 21st day of May, 2007 (received by the Appellant on the 8th day of June, 2007), the Respondent’s Governing Council in exercise of its powers under section 22(1) of the University of Jos Act set up an Appeals Committee to review its decision and enable aggrieved people like the Plaintiff to seek redress internally. (b) Appellant appealed to the Appeals Committee of the Respondent, which reviewed the decision of the Respondent as it affects the Appellant and others and thereafter reported to the Respondent’s Council. (c) The Respondent’s Council met over the Report of its Appeals Committee on 27th day of September, 2007 and, by its letter dated 28th day of September, 2007 but received by the Appellant on the 26th day of October, 2007 conveyed to the Appellant its final decision not to change its earlier decision. The letter is attached to the claim, and is contained in page 23 of the record. Now, from the foregoing paragraphs, it is crystal clear that the Governing Council of the Respondent which by Section 5 of the University of Jos Act “shall be the governing body with the general control and superintendence of the policy…” of the Respondent, put in place, an internal or domestic remedy to wit: an Appeals Committee, to enable the Appellant, among others, seek an internal redress of his grievance. This being the case, it is in accord with common sense for one to assume that it is only and only when the Appellant had exhausted all the remedies available to him in the domestic forum of the Respondent, that the Appellant’s cause of action accrued. As can be gleaned from the records, it is clear that it was on the 27th day of September, 2007, at its special meeting that the Counsel of Respondent met and “considered the report from its Committee on Appeals against Severance Appointments…” including that of the Appellant, it was at the said meeting that the Respondent’s Council decided to finally seal its decision to terminate the Appointment of the Appellant. The question that must be asked and answered is, would it not have been premature for the Appellant to have rushed to Court while his appeal was pending before the Appeals Committee duly set up by his employer (the Respondent) to review its decision to terminate the Appellant? The answer to this question, needless to say must be in the affirmative. I am of the firm view that until the Appellant exhausted the said domestic remedy available to him in the Respondent, it would have been premature for him to go to Court, and time did not start to run against him until the exhaustion of the domestic remedy.’
‘In the light of all that has been said supra, I hold with ease that the appeal process put in place by the Respondent to review or reconsider its decision is not tantamount to negotiation between the parties. And it is the Respondent’s letter of 28th day of September, 2007, received by the Appellant’s on 26th day of October, 2007 that set the stage for the Appellants cause of action, and not the letter of 21st day of May, 2007, which was the subject of the appeal. Consistent with the above holding, I also hold that it was the letter of 28th day of September, 2007 that made the Plaintiff’s cause of action complete as it was the last straw. Any Court action before that letter would have been premature and bad for incompetence. The lone issue is resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.’]
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.
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✓ DECISION:
‘In conclusion, with the lone issue resolved in favour of the Appellant, the appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The Ruling of the lower Court must be and it is hereby set aside. The case is remitted back to the Federal High Court Jos to be tried on the merit.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ DEFINITION OF CAUSE OF ACTION – WHAT IS CAUSE OF ACTION?
In the case of Akilu v. Fawehinmi (No. 2) (supra) the Supreme Court per our erudite emeritus Justice, Karibi Whyte, JSC defined a cause of action thus: “Cause of action has been held to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle Appellant to succeed or all those things necessary to give a right to relief in law or equity.” The law is settled and defined in a long chain of decided cases that it is the totality of the facts pleaded in the statement of claim that determines when the Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued. In Omomeji v. Kolawale (2008) 14 NWLR (Part 1106) 180 at 205, the Supreme Court, per Tabai, J.S.C. held that: “It is settled law that it is the totality of the averments in the statement of claim that determines the accrual of cause of action.” — T. Abdullahi JCA.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Tijjani Abdullahi, J.C.A.
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
Mr. Ugwuala.
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
Mrs. Adeniyi.
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
⦿ PARTY IS REQUIRED TO EXHAUST LOCAL REMEDIES BEFORE SUING
✓ In the case of Akintemi v. Onwumechili (1985) 1 NWLR (Part 1) 68 at 85, paragraph H, the Supreme Court, per Obaseki, JSC said: “If a matter is justifiable in Nigeria, the domestic nature of the dispute does not, under the 1979 Constitution oust the jurisdiction of the court …. it can only mean that until the remedies available in the domestic forum are exhausted, any resort to court action would be premature”.
✓ Again in the case of University of Ilorin v. Oluwadare (2006) 14 NWLR (1000) 751 at 781 to 782, the apex Court, per Tabai JSC said; “Where he rushes to Court without first exhausting all the remedies for redress available to him within the domestic forum, as was the case of Akintemi v. Onwumechili (supra) he would be held to have ‘jumped the gun’ and the matter would be declared bad for incompetence.”
✓ In a more recent case of University of Jos v. Ikegwuoha (supra) it was emphatically held by the apex Court, per Alagoa, J.S.C thus: “Let me say for the umpteenth time that the cause of action could only have arisen on the 2nd October, 1997 when the appellant made it known that it would not confirm the appointment of the respondent. The court below was therefore right when it held that the cause of action arose on the 2nd October, 1997 when the fate of the respondent became sealed”.
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
