➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
David Amadi v. Attorney – General, Imo State (CA/PH/417A/2007, 18 May 2012)
by Branham Chima (LL.B.)
➥ ISSUES RAISED
Alibi,
Armed robbery.
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
The case for the prosecution was that on 3-5-1998 at about 2 a.m, armed robbers invaded the house of PW1, one Mr. Vitalis Abareke, at Umuebe in Akabor. PW1 who was sleeping by that time was awoke by the barking of his dogs. He drew near the window and saw people dressed in black shirts and trousers. The robbers tried to force the door open and he was shouting “thieves, thieves” when the robbers eventually gained entrance into his house they robbed him of various sums of money totaling N90, 000.00 (Ninety Thousand Naira) and a trident radio worth N7, 400.00 (Seven Thousand, Four Hundred Naira). In the course of the robbery, he saw and recognized the robbers as David Amadi (the Appellant, Ikechukwu Ukanacho the 2nd accused, Matthew Nwokocha Onyemeze the 3rd accused and one Kingsley Amadi still at large. During the robbery the 3rd accused, Mattew Nwokocha Onyemeze instructed the others to beat PW1 to death or he will retaliate. The 3rd accused, Matthew Nwokocha Onyemeze then picked up an empty bottle on PW1’s dining table and broke same on PW1’s head and used the sharp edge to stab PW1 on the head. PW1 recognized the robbers by the aid of moonlight through his window glass he opened a little having drawn the curtain earlier. The robbers were people from his community and he knew them prior to the incident. In the morning, he reported the incident to the Police at Iho. He made a statement to the Police at Iho and mentioned the names of the accused persons the Appellant and one Kingsley Amadi still at large inclusive as the people that robbed him. The matter was subsequently transferred to the state CID Owerri where he also made a statement on 11-5-98 and mentioned the names of the armed robbers again.
In the morning, he reported the incident to the Police at Iho. He made a statement to the Police at Iho and mentioned the names of the accused persons the Appellant and one Kingsley Amadi still at large inclusive as the people that robbed him. The matter was subsequently transferred to the state CID Owerri where he also made a statement on 11-5-98 and mentioned the names of the armed robbers again.
The Appellant, David Amadi testified in his defence and adopted his statement to the Police (Exh. B) as part of his defence. He testified that on the night of 3rd May, 1998 he was in their house throughout the night and that he did not go anywhere. He denied committing the offence charged with and stated further in his evidence that he is a musician and was arrested where he and his musical group went to play music at Uzoagba during a burial ceremony on 10th of May, 1998. At the end of the trial, the learned trial Judge convicted the Appellant and the two other accused persons as charged and sentenced accordingly.
➥ ISSUE(S) & RESOLUTION(S)
[APPEAL DISMISSED]
↪️ I. Whether in a criminal trial the burden of proof is on the accused/appellant to prove or substantiate the defence of alibi raised or put forward by him?
RESOLUTION: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE APPELLANT DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF ALIBI AT THE EARLIEST STAGE
‘In deciding issue No. 1 it must be made clear that the Appellant did not raise any defence of alibi in his statement to the Police Exhibit ‘B’. The learned counsel for the Appellant misunderstood the facts when he categorically asserted that the Appellant raised a defence of alibi in Exhibit “B” and thereafter followed up the same in his evidence in court … Indeed, what might be regarded as a defence of alibi by the Appellant arose for the first time in his examination in Chief from the witness box that: “…On the night of 3rd May 1998 I slept in our house all through the night till morning. I did not go to any place. I slept with my father that night…” Obviously, the above by the Appellant is a belated plea of alibi, perhaps an improper plea of alibi. It is settled law that for the defence of alibi to be properly raised it must be raised at the earliest opportunity when the accused person is confronted by the Police with the commission of an offence so that the police will be in a position to investigate the alibi. See, Ebenchi v. The State (2009) 179 LRCN 91 at 101. Truly, the prosecution has a duty to investigate an accused person’s alibi, but that is only when such alibi is set up at the earliest opportunity during the investigation stage preferably in the accused person’s statement to the Police. See, Ikemson v. The State (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1110) P.479.’
PARTICULARS OF ALIBI WAS NOT PROVIDED
‘Also, to take advantage of the defence of alibi, the accused person must give a detailed particularization of his whereabout on the day of the offence which must include not just the specific place(s) where he was but additionally the people in whose company he was and what if any transpired at the said time and place(s). The complaint of the Appellant in relation to Issue No. 1 concerns the statement of the learned trial Judge at page 166 of the record to the effect that “As I stated earlier, the 1st accused (Appellant) David Amadi denied the charge and put up a defence of alibi. He told the court that he slept in their house with his father neither his father nor any member of his family testified to substantiate his claim.” … The above argument by the learned counsel for the Appellant cannot be sustained in the instant case. In actual fact, the Appellant in this case never raised a defence of alibi or did not properly raise a defence of alibi. This is because, to be proper in the eye of the law, the defence of alibi has its conditions, its prerequisites and its procedural requirements. What the Appellant did in this case was to give evidence of “alibi” that is his whereabout for the first time in the witness box. The learned trial Judge was therefore not wrong and did not in any way err in law when he held that the evidence of the Appellant as to his whereabout on the day of the incident was not substantiated by any member of his family.’]
.
.
↪️ II. Whether the act of the appellant’s father attending a meeting in the house of the complainant (PW1) to inquire why the name of his son was mentioned in the robbery incident does in law, constitute proof of commission of the offence by the appellant?
RESOLUTION: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[NO MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE WAS REACHED
‘This view of the learned trial Judge expressed at page 167 of the record in which he sought to find corroboration of the evidence of PW1 and PW2 in the fact of the Appellant’s father attendance at meeting as well as in the statement of 3rd accused, Exhibit D does not in the circumstances of the case lead to any miscarriage of justice. The finding of the learned trial Judge at page 167 of the record clearly shows that the trial Judge had already believed the eye witness account of PW1 as to the events and the people that were involved in the robbery as well as the evidence of PW2 before finding corroboration in other pieces of evidence.’
‘The attempt by the learned trial Judge to find corroboration either in the Appellant’s father’s visit or meeting in the house of PW1 or in the statement of the 3rd accused – Exhibit D was an unnecessary surplausage, in the circumstances of this case. The Appellant would still have been rightly convicted on the evidence of PW1 and PW2 without any corroboration or confirmation of the evidence of those two witnesses from any other source(s). The finding of the learned trial Judge at page 167 of the record does not occasion any miscarriage of justice in this case.’]
.
.
↪️ III. Whether the statement of the 3rd accused person tendered in the course of trial as Exhibit D in the lower court, in Law, constitutes evidence against the appellant or can be used against him when he did not adopt it as his statement?
RESOLUTION: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[WITHOUT THE STATEMENT THE APPELLANT WOULD HAVE STILL BEEN CONVICTED.
‘The more important part of the submission of the Respondent’s counsel in relation to issue No. 3 is that the decision to convict the Appellant on the eye witness account of PW1 and the evidence of PW2 cannot be faulted with or without Exhibit ‘D’. In other words, as I similarly noted in the consideration of issue No. 2, the reference to Exhibit D at page 167 of the record as corroborating the evidence of PW1 and PW2 for the purpose of convicting the Appellant was a mere surplausage. This, however, does not incur any miscarriage of justice as the learned trial Judge was not indeed obliged by law to find any further corroboration to the eye witness account of PW1 which had already fixed the Appellant with the crime charged. In Okoro v. State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 181 at 216, Wali JSC held that: No law says that an accused person cannot be convicted on the clear and unimpeachable evidence of a single witness, such evidence does not require corroboration.” See also Adelumola v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 683 at 691, Anthony Igbo v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 70 at 75, Ali and Anor. v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 1, Emine v. State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 204) 480 at 413.’]
.
.
↪️ IV. Whether the fact of the appellant escaping to Uzoagba and attempting to run on realizing that the Police came to arrest him in law amounts to evidence of commission of any crime?
RESOLUTION: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[‘At page 45 of the record, the PW2 Emmanuel Igwe, force No. 135244 Sgt. Stated inter alia as follows. “On the 9th May, 1998 information reached us that the 1st accused, David Amadi was sported at Uzoagba. I led a team of detectives to Uzoagba. Uzoagba is in Ikeduru Local Government Area. There we met the 1st accused on top of a tree. He was lulled down as I told him I was an intending customer on coming down he sighted the other men with me and took to his heels. We pursued and arrested him. He was brought down to the office where I charged and cautioned him with an offence of armed robbery. He volunteered statement which I recorded, read it over to him and he admitted it as his and signed…” The above piece of evidence is part of the record of the lower court, it was not manufactured or conjured by the learned trial Judge and therefore, a finding based on such evidence cannot be said to be perverse. On the question of whether the learned trial Judge was in error to have used the fact of Appellant’s escaping to Uzoagba and attempt to escape when he sighted the police as corroboration of the evidence of PW1 and PW2, the simple answer as was the case with issues Nos. 2 and 3 is that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 which the learned trial Judge had believed and acted upon do not in fact need any corroboration. Thus, here again, the conviction of the Appellant would still stand irrespective of the fact of using the evidence of the appellant’s attempt to escape as corroboration and clearly there was no miscarriage of justice.’]
.
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↪️ V. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt as required by law, that the appellant committed the offence for which he was convicted and sentenced by the trial court?
RESOLUTION: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[‘In deciding Appellant’s issue No. 5, it must be noted that none of the observations of the learned Appellant’s counsel on the evaluation of evidence in the trial impeaches the finding of the trial court in convicting the Appellant of the offence charged. For example, contrary to the suggestion of the learned counsel for the Appellant, there is no law which says a conviction for the offence of armed robbery cannot be sustained solely on the evidence of a victim eye witness to the commission of the offence. Again, the statement of PW1 at page 38 of the record that he mentioned the name of the Appellant in his statement to the police at Iho except the police did not write it down was a positive and consistent reaction to cross-examination by PW1. That, statement did not indicate any inconsistency with either his evidence in chief or his previous statements on the issue.’
‘On the whole, I agree with the learned counsel for the Respondent that the prosecution proved all the ingredients of the offence of armed robbery against the Appellant by the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3. In particular, the prosecution succeeded in this case to prove. (i) Theft by the accused person(s) (ii) The causing of hurt or wrongful restraint on the victims by the accused persons(s) (iii) The act(s) complained of were done in the process of committing the theft or in order to commit the theft and or carry away the property by theft. See, Abdullai v. The State (2008) 16 LCRN page 96.’]
.
.
.
✓ DECISION:
‘The conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offence of armed robbery is accordingly affirmed.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ PROOF OF EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS
Finally, on this score, proof of evidence is to criminal trials what pleadings is to civil trials. The proof of evidence in a criminal trial does not have to contain every bit of evidence that the prosecution requires as long as it contains relevant and sufficient facts to sustain the case of the prosecution. — M.A. Owoade JCA.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Mojeed Adekunle Owoade, JCA.
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
