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Alhaji Raimi Akanji Yusuf & Ors V. Alhaji Akindipe & Ors. (SC.157/1994  • 26 May 2000)

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➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Alhaji Raimi Akanji Yusuf & Ors V. Alhaji Akindipe & Ors. (SC.157/1994  • 26 May 2000)

by Branham Chima (LL.B.)

➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Exclusive possession;
Reasonable cause of action.

➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
In the High Court of Lagos State, the plaintiffs claimed from the defendants as follows: “the sum of ₦10,000.00 being general damages suffered by the plaintiffs and their members when the defendants, through their agents and/or servants on the 8th February, 1987 and on subsequent days, without any lawful authority or consent of the plaintiffs, broke into the plaintiff’s Mosques at No. B5/111, Ahmadiya Road, Agege (A Lis Pendens in Suit Nos. M.137/84 and CA/L/247/86), and dispersed the plaintiffs and their members with tear gas and batton (sic) during worship and barricade (sic) the entrance with contingent of armed policemen to prevent the plaintiffs and their members from using the said Mosques whereof the plaintiffs claim further the following orders: 1. An order that the action of the defendants is a contempt of the court proceedings in Suit Nos. M/137/84 and CA/L/247/86. 2. An order that the defendants do forthwith remove Police contingents posted at the said Mosques or Mosques belonging to the plaintiffs. 3. An injunction restraining the defendants, their agents and/or servants from ever interfering in the private disputes over the ownership of the Mosques (i) at No. B5/111, Ahmadiya Road, Agege, and (ii) No. 41. Shitta Street. Dopemu. Agege, Lagos State.” The first three defendants were the original defendants in the suit. The 4th to 8th defendants applied to the trial court to be joined as co-defendants. An order was made accordingly. Thereafter, the 4th – 8th defendants brought an application before Onalaja J (as he then was) praying the court for an order dismissing the action filed by the plaintiffs in that: “(i) The plaintiffs have not shown on the writ of summons, statement of claim etc. that they have locus standi to institute this action. (ii) The writ of summons, statement of claim and reply disclose no reasonable cause of action.”

Available:  National Electric Power Authority v. R. O. Alli & Anor. (1992)

In a reserved ruling, after hearing arguments of counsel, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application. The 4th – 8th defendants were dissatisfied with the ruling and appeal to the Court of Appeal. Lagos Division. The appeal was dismissed by Ayoola and Kalgo. JJCA (as they then were). Uwaifo, JCA (as he then was) dissented. The 4th – 8th defendants have further appealed to this court.

➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether the Plaintiffs have a cause of action?

➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL DISMISSED]

↪️ ISSUE 1: IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOUR.

[THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE IN EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION AND THUS CAN INVOKE THE COURT’S JURISDICTION
‘From the writ of summons and statement of claim, the plaintiffs have, prima facie shown that they are in exclusive possession of the mosques situated at the two addresses mentioned and that the defendants interfered with their possession. Since only the person in possession can sue for trespass, it cannot be argued that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 for the determination of the legal rights which they assert. I am in no doubt that they disclosed in their statement of claim their “standing” to institute the proceedings. See Adesanya v. President of Nigeria (1981) 2 NCLR 358. Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984)1 SCNLR 390 and Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986)1 NWLR. (Pt.18) 669.’

THE PLAINTIFFS ARE JURISTIC PERSONALITIES
‘It was the contention of the appellants that the 1st set of respondents are not as constituted, a juristic entity which is recognised under the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act Cap. 98. Laws or the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 which was repealed by section 695 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 59, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 and that the existence of a body called “Followers of Ghullam Ahmed” is not one capable of being judicially noticed. It is true that the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act Cap. 98 (1958) has been repealed by the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990. Its provisions were substantially re-enacted in Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 but the appellant’s claim is based on actual possession and freedom to worship without interference in the two mosques which they claim to be in their exclusive possession. The three plaintiff on record claim the rights for themselves and in a representative capacity. It is enough if the group or class of persons sought to be represented are easily identifiable and have a common purpose. A leaf can be borrowed from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Adegbite and Ors. v. Chief Imam Q. B. Lawal and Ors.  12 WACA 398 where the plaintiffs/respondents for themselves and the Muslim Community of Ijebu Ode Central Mosque sued the defendants/appellants on behalf of themselves and their fellow seceders from Muslim Community or Ijebu Ode Central Mosque. Damages were awarded in favour of plaintiff who sued in a representative capacity. I am therefore not in any doubt that the plaintiffs are proper parties who can request the court to adjudicate on the issue of trespass disclosed in their statement of claim.’]
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✓ DECISION:
‘On a careful perusal of the materials put forward by the appellants in the course of their application, there is no doubt that the 1st set of respondents (plaintiffs) will be facing an uphill task at the trial. However, I am of the clear view that a reasonable cause of action is disclosed in the statement of claim and the case should go to trial. I therefore dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the court below. Parties are to bear their own costs.’

Available:  AG Of Abia State & Ors v. AG Of The Federation (2003)

➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION AND WHEN TITLE IS PUT IN ISSUE
It is trite law that trespass to land is actionable at the suit of the person in possession of the land. It is a violation of a possessory right and does not generally involve title to land. A person in possession can sue for trespass even if he is neither the owner of the land nor a privy to the owner. Exclusive possession of the land gives the person in such possession the right to retain it and to undisturbed enjoyment of it against all wrong-doers except a person who can establish a better title. Once a defendant claims to be the owner of the land in dispute, title is put in issue, and to succeed, the plaintiff must show a better title than that of the defendant. See Amakor v. Obiefuna (1974) All NLR 109. — Ogwuegbu JSC.

Available:  Jackie Phillips v. Arco Ltd (Pharmaco Biological Institute) (1971)

⦿ A WEAK CASE DOES NOT PREVENT A REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION
A reasonable cause of action with some reasonable chance of success when only the allegations in the pleading statement of claim are considered. So long as the statement of claim discloses some cause of action, or raises some question fit to be decided by a judge as in this case. The mere fact that the case is weak, and not likely to succeed, is no ground for striking it out or dismissing it. See Wenlock v. Moloney (I965) 2 All ER. 871. — Ogwuegbu JSC.

➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Ogwuegbu, JSC.

➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)

⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)

➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)

➥ REFERENCED (CASE)

➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)

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