➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Bronik Motors Ltd & Anor. V. Wema Bank Ltd (SC.110/1982, 1983)
by Branham Chima (LL.B.)
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Federal Revenue Court;
Constitutional interpretation.
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
In this Suit which commenced in the High Court of Lagos State as Suit No. LD/404/80, the plaintiff (i.e. respondent herein) brought a claim against the defendants (appellants herein) in the following terms:
“1. Specific performance of an agreement between the parties and evidenced in letters dated 10th January 1976, 28th January, 1976, and 2nd February, 1976, whereby the defendants promised to execute legal mortgage of the defendants’ properties lying and situate at (a) Herbert Macaulay Street, Yaba, Lagos (b) Adekunle Fajuyi Street, Ibadan (c) Ijebu-Bye Pass, Oke Ado, Ibadan (d) 21 Barracks Road, Calabar and (e) Mile 3 Abe/Port Harcourt Road, Aba; in favour of the plaintiff to secure various overdrafts amounting to over N2,000,000 made, to the defendants in Lagos between 1976 and 1978.
The sum of N2,135,092.57k (Two Million One Hundred and Thirty Five Thousand Ninety Two Naira and Fifty Seven Kobo) being balance due to the plaintiff for overdrafts granted by the plaintiff to the first defendant at the plaintiff’s Mushin and Ebute Metta Branches, in the normal course of their business as bankers to first defendant at their request and for bank charges, incidental expenses upon money due from the defendants to the plaintiffs which money the defendants have refused and/or neglected to pay in spite of repeated demands. Plaintiff also claims interest on the said sum of N2, 135,092.57k at the rate of 8% per annum from 1st October, 1979, until final liquidation of the whole debt or part thereof.”
Pleadings were ordered and were duly filed and exchanged by the parties. After a protracted trial in which 28 exhibits were tendered and received in evidence, Onalaja, J. in a detailed and painstaking judgment delivered on 24th April, 1981, found in favour of the plaintiff bank.
The appellants herein being dissatisfied with that judgment appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as the Court of Appeal).
In the said judgment, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeal and confirmed the judgment of the High Court in part. The order for specific performance made by the High Court in respect of 400 Herbert Macaulay Street, Yaba, and 21 Barracks Road, Calabar was set aside as null and void. It is against this judgment that the appellants have appealed to this Court.
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether it is the Federal Revenue Court and not the State High Court that has jurisdiction in this case?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL DISMISSED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE FEDERAL REVENUE COURT WILL ONLY HAVE JURISDICTION WHERE IT INVOLVES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE
‘I have no doubt that the intention was to vest jurisdiction in the Federal Revenue Court to deal with civil matters relating to the matters enumerated in sub-sections (b) and (c) in so far as they relate, to the revenue of the Government of the Federation. That would colour the meaning to be attached to all those enumerated subjects e.g. banking. There has to be a revenue element, which involves the Federal Government. Although the explanatory note inserted at the end of the Act is neither a part of it nor intended as a sure guide to the interpretation of the Provisions, paragraph 3 is instructive. It states as follows:
“The Federal Revenue Court shall have original jurisdiction in certain specified matters including taxation of companies, customs and excise duties, banking, foreign exchange, currency and fiscal measures of the Government of the Federation, and priority is to be given to all such revenue cases . . .”
The minority judgment, and Chief Williams has urged us to accept it, and argued that “banking”, “foreign exchange”, and “currency”, should each stand alone and be construed as such because of the commas which separate them and that banking was used as a noun in section 7(1)(b)(iii) of the Act. With the greatest respect, in my view this rendering would only be possible if the of the Act had indeed read thus:
“(b) connected with or pertaining to
(iii) banking
(iv) foreign exchange
(v) currency or
(vi) other fiscal measures.”
On the contrary the was “(iii) banking, foreign exchange, currency or other fiscal measures”. This led to the conclusion of the majority that the proper interpretation of the sub-section and the natural and ordinary meaning must be “banking measures”, “foreign exchange measures”, “currency measures” and “other fiscal measures”.’
‘Having held that the majority judgment is right in construing section 7(1)(b)(iii) such that the Federal Revenue Court is restricted to its essentially revenue protection functions while the State High Courts deal with such matters in which no issue of the revenue of the Government of the Federation arises, I would agree that there has to be express provision and a more definitive provision than section 7(1)(b )(iii) before one can accept the contention that “all banking matters” must fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.’]
.
.
↪️ ISSUE 2: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL CAUSE ON STATE COURTS
‘In my view that jurisdiction will diminish with time as in addition to the jurisdiction which I have conceded in this judgment it already has under sections 230, 237 and 42 of the Constitution. The Federal High Court is conferred by the National Assembly with more jurisdiction in relation to other matters in the Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative Lists.
I would finally on this point wish to suggest that far from supporting the contention of the appellants on the issue of Federal and State Judicial power, sections 250 and 231 of the 1979 Constitution are put in their proper perspective by the historical facts to which I made reference above. Since the newly created Federal High Court (i.e. in the Constituent Assembly) had no Federal subordinate courts, it seemed logical to confer jurisdiction in Federal causes which may arise at such level on State courts. Appeal in such matters would go to the State High Courts.
I am afraid that for these reasons I am unable to accept the submissions of the learned senior counsel to the appellants on the proper meaning of section 230(1)(b). This ground of appeal also fails.’]
.
.
.
✓ DECISION:
‘For all the foregoing reasons this appeal must fail and it does fail. It is accordingly dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal dated 6th July, 1982. I also award N300 costs against the appellants in favour of respondents.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applied to all written instruments. The obscurity or doubt of any particular word may be removed by reference to associated words. And the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restricted by referring to the object of the whole clause in which it is used. — Nnamani JSC.
⦿ THE CONSTITUTION IS A LIVING DOCUMENT AND SHOULD BE INTERPRETED BROADLY
In approaching this Constitutional problem, it might be useful to reiterate some of the principles of construction of Constitutions as laid down in decisions of our Courts. A Constitution is a living document (not just a statute) providing a framework for the governance of a country not only for now but for generations yet unborn. In construing it, undue regard must not be paid to merely technical rules for otherwise the objects of its provisions as well as the intention of the framers of the Constitution would be frustrated.
As was stated in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher (1979 2 W.L.R. 899; 1980 A.C. 319 at 328 a Constitutional instrument should not necessarily be construed in a manner and according to rules which apply to Acts of Parliament. Although the manner of interpretation of a constitutional instrument should give effect to the language used, recognition should also be given to the character and origins of the instrument. Such an instrument should be treated as sui generis calling for principles of interpretation of its own suitable to its character without necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are relevant to legislation of private law.
It has also been accepted by all our courts that a broad and liberal spirit should prevail in interpreting the provisions of our Constitution although one has constantly to bear in mind the object, which such provisions were intended to serve. — Nnamani JSC.
⦿ SPIRIT OF FEDERALISM IN A CONSTITUTION CANNOT OVERRIDE THE ACTUAL WORDS IN A CONSTITUTION
But we must not make too much of this principle of federalism for it is quite obvious that the spirit of federalism in a Constitution cannot override the, actual words used in the Constitution. — Nnamani JSC.
⦿ JURISDICTION WAS NOT EXPRESSLY CONFERRED ON THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS ON THE EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE LIST
Nowhere in the 1979 Constitution was jurisdiction expressly conferred on the Federal High Court with respect to matters within the Exclusive Legislative List. This was not a matter that could have been dealt with by implication, for as was held in Prigg v. Pennsylvania (Supra) a court has no right to insert any clause in the Constitution, which is not expressed and cannot be fairly implied. Implied powers also have to be necessary or incidental to expressed powers: See MacKenzie v. Hare 239 US 299, 36 S. Ct 106. It seems clear to me that the only jurisdiction expressly conferred on the Federal High Court by the 1979 Constitution are contained in sections 42 and 237(2)(a). It would also appear to me that the effect of the decisions of the Court of Appeal on the meaning of section 230(1)(a) and (b) is to hold that they are self executing in the sense that they are Constitutional provisions complete in themselves and which need no further legislation such as an Act of the National Assembly to bring them into force. For the reasons I shall give below, I would say with due respect, that to that extent those decisions of the Court of Appeal are, wrong. There does not appear to be controversy as to the proper meaning of section 230(2) of the 1979 Constitution. In my view that section not only restyles the old “Federal Revenue Court” “Federal High Court” but vests in the Federal High Court all the powers and jurisdiction enjoyed by the old Revenue Court. Accordingly, in my view pursuant to section 274 of the 1979 Constitution, the Federal High Court will continue to enjoy such jurisdiction and powers as were conferred on the Federal Revenue Court by the Federal Revenue Court Act No. 13 of 1973, section 8(3) of the Counterfeit Currency (Special Provisions) Act, 1974 No. 22 of 1974 as amended by the Constitution of the Federation (Consequential Repeals) Act No. 105 of 1979, section 21(1), 49(1), 62 of the Insurance Act 1976 No. 59 of 1976, and the Bankruptcy Act 1979 No. 16 of 1979. — Nnamani JSC.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Nnamani, J.S.C.
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
Chief Williams, S.A.N.
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
Mr. Ladosu Ladapo.
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
