➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Chief Ali Maged Taan V. SCOA Nigeria Plc (SC.1191/2018, Friday 13th December 2024)
by Branham Chima (LL.B.)
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Co-owner;
Unregistered instrument;
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
In the appellant’s amended statement of claim, he tabled against the respondents the following reliefs:
(i) A declaration that the claimant is a joint-owner with the 2nd defendant of the property situate at and known as 157 Apapa-Oshodi Expressway, Iyana Isolo, Lagos State with an area of 1.396 hectares and which property is presently occupied by the 1st defendant.
(ii) A declaration that the 3rd defendant has no subsisting or any interest in the property situate at and any known as 157 Apapa-Oshodi Expressway, Iyana Isolo, Lagos(ii)State.
This appeal interrogates the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division (hereunder addressed as “the lower court”), coram judice: Yargata B. Nimpar, Biobebe A. Georgewill and Jamilu Y. Tukur, JJCA, in Appeal No. CA/L/277/2013, delivered on the 9th March, 2018. In its judgment, the lower court affirmed partially the decision of the High Court of Lagos State (the trial court), presided by O. A. Taiwo, J., in suit No. 10/678/2007, delivered on the 16thNovember, 2012, wherein the trial court dismissed the appellant’s suit and granted partly the second and third respondents’ counter-claim.
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether the court below was not wrong when it affirmed the decision of the trial court which held that by the provisions of S.15 of the Land Instruments Registration Law of Lagos State, Exh. C which had originally been admitted in evidence without objection was inadmissible in evidence?
II. Whether the court below was not wrong when, rather than hold that 2nd respondent did not discharge the onus of proof cast on her by law as to due execution of Exh.C, it rejected appellant’s argument in that respect on the ground that it is a fresh issue raised without leave of court?
III. Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the court below was not wrong to have granted in favour of the 2nd respondent the reliefs sought in the counter-claim?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL DISMISSED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE INSTRUMENT IS UNREGISTERED AND THUS INADMISSIBLE
‘There is no atom of evidence on the body of the 2 – page deed of agreement showcasing that it was stamped and or registered in the Land Registry in Lagos State or elsewhere. It is, therefore, not out of place to categorise it as a nude document that acquired the legal stigma of an unregistered registrable instrument. It is decipherable from the clear phraseology of the deed of agreement and the tenor of the pleading, displayed above, that it paraded the necessary and required characteristics of an instrument with the clear mission to bequeath legal interest of co-ownership to the appellant over the property. Put simply, the appellant pleaded the deed of agreement as concrete evidence to demonstrate that the second respondent transferred co-ownership title in the property to him. In sum, it was pleaded and admitted in evidence to prove legal title in the property. It was not pleaded, nor tendered, as a purchase receipt evidencing payment of money, in a transaction involving the property, so as to take shelter under the saving sanctuary of the qualification cognizable by law in the admission of an unregistered registrable instrument as espoused in Okoye v. Dumez (Nig) Ltd.(supra)’
THE COURT OF APPEAL IS ALL RIGHT TO EXPEL THE EXHIBIT
‘Flowing from this tour d’horizon on the admissibility of an unregistered registrable instrument, done in due consultation with law, the lower court’s undiluted affirmation of the trial court’s expulsion of the deed of agreement, dated the 25th May, 1983, the exhibit C, is in total alignment with the letters and spirit of the provision of section 15 of the Law. It will smell of a serious judicial sacrilege to interfere with a judicial decision that discloses no iota of hostility to the law. I endorse in toto the lower court’s decision on the point. The exhibit remains expelled from the appeal. In the result, this issue is resolved against the appellant and in favour of the respondents.’]
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↪️ ISSUE 2: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS ON THE APPELLANT
‘Thus, the appellant made the allegation of endorsement of the deed of agreement against the second respondent. That is an assertion of existence of facts par excellence. It is axiomatic that the appellant, who was the claimant in the trial court, is the one who desired and hungered for the favorable judgment of the court. Indubitably, he was a qualified candidate to earn the favour of the court in the presence of proof of the existence of the allegation that the second respondent signed the deed of agreement as a vehicle
to convey joint-ownership interest in the property to him. It was the appellant, and none other, that stood to lose the judgment if the due execution of the deed of agreement was not established. In the premises, the appellant owned the legal burden to establish the existence of the second respondent’s execution of the deed agreement. It is only after the appellant had discharged this burden, heaped on him by law, that the onus would shift to the second respondent to puncture the allegation and evidence adduced by the appellant as provided by the prescription of section 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
That is not all. The appellant’s quarrel, that the second respondent signed the deed of agreement, is, in the eyes of the law, a classic exemplification of a positive assertion. I dare say, it ispessimi exempli of an affirmative assertion. On the contrary, the second respondent’s standpoint, a disclaimer/renunciation of the execution of the deed of agreement, non est factum, finds comfort within the perimeter of a negative assertion. In the Latin days of the law, it was couched: incumbit probatio qui dicit, non quit negat- the burden of proving of facts rests on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue not upon a party who denies it, see Omisorev. Aregbesola (supra). This signifies that the law, in its infinite wisdom, has placed the onus probandi on the appellant, the positive assertor, to demonstrate that the second respondent executed the deed of agreement.’
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF PROOF
‘On account of this cardinal and elastic principles of law on burden of proof, the appellant’s seemingly dazzling contention, with the potential goal to allot the legal and evidential burden of proof of the execution of the document to the second respondent, with due reverence, flies in the face of the pleading and the law. The net effect is this. The trial court’s finding that the appellant owned the burden of proof of the due execution of the deed of agreement, which he failed to discharge, which received the judicial blessing of the lower court, is an impeccable one. On this score, all the censures, which the appellant rained on the lower court’s approbation of the immaculate finding, peter into insignificance. This court does not tinker with a finding that does constitute an insult and irritation to the tenets of the law. In all, I have no choice than to resolve the issue two against the appellant and in favour of the respondents.’]
.
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↪️ ISSUE 3: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE RELIEF OF SOLE-OWNERSHIP WAS CLAIMED IN THE COUNTER-CLAIM
‘Now, I had, at the terminus a quo of this judgment, assembled the eight reliefs supplicated by the second and third respondents in their counter-claim. For fear of being guilty of superfluity, I will resist the temptation to import, replicate and propagate them here. It admits of no argument that none of the reliefs, among the college of the army of reliefs, implored the court to declare the second respondent as the sole owner of the property. I, therefore, agree with the appellant that there is no specific claim for that award.’
‘By the same token, the lower court affirmed the prayer of the counter-claim, id est, that the appellant is neither the sole nor co-owner of the property in dispute. In the presence of these existential and concrete pieces of evidence, the leasehold right which the second respondent acquired in 1981, from the Onitire family of Lagos, which is conserved in exhibit A, remained the only surviving document which equipped the second respondent with the dignified status of the sole beneficial owner of the property. A beneficial owner is an owner who enjoys completely or all the rights and privileges legally possible for an owner to have/possessin respect of a leased property, see Alii v. Ikusebiala (1985) 1NWLR (Pt. 4) 630 at 640. That was what the compelling evidence on record, the touchstone of the appeal, portrayed. The bounden duty of a court, trial or appellate, in our inquisitorial system of adjudication, in a civil claim, is to merely render unto a party in accordance to his proven claim, see Agu v. Odofin (1992) 3 SCNJ161; (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 350. Thus, the lower court did not constitute itself into a santa claus that doles out ex gratia awards to recipients who never solicited for them. I, therefore, find no justification, in the legal sphere, to agree with the appellant that the lower court desecrated the law when it awarded sole ownership of the property to the second respondent as it germinated from the pungent evidence furnished before it. In a nutshell, the lower court paid due obeisance to the law when it affirmed the grant of the prayer in the second and third respondents’ counter-claim.’]
.
.
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✓ DECISION:
‘On the whole, having resolved the trinity issues against the appellant, the destiny of the appeal is plain. It is bereft of any merit and awaits the reserved penalty of dismissal. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, the decision of the lower court delivered on the 9th March, 2018, in Appeal No. CA/L/277/2013,.is, hereby, affirmed. The parties shall bear the respective costs they incurred in the prosecution and defence of the ill-fated appeal.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ A NON-REGISTERED INSTRUMENT CAN BE USED TO PROVE EQUITABLE TITLE
Bello, JSC, as he then was, in Okoye v. Dumez (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 783 at 790 in these scintillating words: It is trite law that a purchaser of land or a lessee in possession of the land by virtue of a registrable instrument which has not been registered and has paid the purchase money or the rent to the vendor or lessor, the nine it her case the purchaser or the lessee has acquired an equitable interest in the land which is as good as a legal estate and this equitable interest can only be defeated by a purchaser of the land for value without notice of the prior equity. A Registrable instrument which has not been registered is admissible to prove such equitable interest and prove payment of purchase of money or rent …. See, also, Oni v. Arimoro (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 189;Adesanya v. Aderonmu (2000) 6 SC (Pt. 11) 18/(2000) 9 NWLR (Pt.672) 370.
⦿ AT JUDGEMENT WRITING STAGE, THE COURT CAN EXPUNGE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE EARLIER ADMITTED
In the course of proceedings in a court, trial or appellate, a piece of evidence (oral or documentary)may, by oversight or inadvertence, be admitted, either in a bench
or considered ruling, by a court and if that court, whether of first instance or appellate, later discovers, at the time of judgment, that that particular piece of evidence is at all event inadmissible in law, then it is entitled, as a matter of debt to justice, to reverse its earlier decision admitting that evidence and rejecting it wholly, see National & Properties Co. Ltd. v. Thompson Organization Ltd.(1969) 1 All NLR 138. It flows that the law grants a trial court the unbridled licence to expunge admitted inadmissible evidence at the judgment stage. An appellate court enjoys the same right so far as the document is inherently inadmissible. The philosophical basis for this is rooted firmly in the hallowed principle of adjectival law. A court of law is drained of the jurisdiction to act on an inadmissible evidence in reaching a decision, see Alade v. Olukade (1976) 2 SC 183. — Ogbuinya JSC.
⦿ WRONG APPORTIONMENT OF BURDEN OF PROOF WILL CAUSE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
The essentiality of proper assignment of burden of proof cannot be over-emphasized in the sphere of adjectival law. In law, a wrong apportionment of burden of proof will smack and occasion a miscarriage of justice, see Onobruchere v. Esegine (1986) 1 NWLR(Pt. 190) 799; PHMB v. Ejifagha (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 677) 154; Ewo v. Ani (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 610. — Ogbuinya JSC.
⦿ A NEGATIVE ASSERTION IS NOT TO BE PROVED IN LAW
A negative assertion does not magnet any burden of proof in that such is incapable of proof. To demand otherwise is akin to asking the party, who asserts the negative, to prove something that is not in existence. That will constitute a serious affront to the legal maxim: lex non cogit ad impossibilia – the law does notcompel to impossible ends. It flows that the burden to prove the second respondent’s due execution of the deed of agreement, albeit on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence, as declared by the provision of section 134 of the Evidence Act 2011, resided on the appellant who asserted the positive. — Ogbuinya JSC.
⦿ RELIEFS NOT SOUGHT CANNOT BE GRANTED BY THE COURT
It is a fundamental law, known for its antiquity, that a court of law is drained of the jurisdiction to grant a relief that is not claimed by a party to a suit, see Ochonma v. Unosi (1965) NMLR 321; The rationale behind this ageless principle of law is not far-fetched. A court of law is not cloaked with the garment of a philanthropist that dishes out awards that are not supplicated by recipients. For a court to make an order which no party has supplicated for and which the parties were not heard constitutes a gross infraction of the other party’s inviolable constitutional right to fair hearing as ingrained in section 36(1) of the Constitution, as amended, the fon set origo of our laws. — Ogbuinya JSC.
⦿ DEFINITION OF BENEFICIAL OWNER
A beneficial owner is an owner who enjoys completely or all the rights and privileges legally possible for an owner to have/possessin respect of a leased property, see Alii v. Ikusebiala (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 630 at 640. That was what the compelling evidence on record, the touchstone of the appeal, portrayed. — Ogbuinya JSC.
⦿ WHAT IS A NULL & VOID ACT
In the legal landscape, the destiny of a null or void act was sealed in Macfoy v. UAC Ltd. (1962) AC152 wherein the oracular Lord Denning, MR, proclaimed: If an act is void, then it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without much ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay. It will collapse. Thus, a void act exudes the illusory and inglorious quality of a mirage that vanishes and vaporizes on an approach to it. A null act is nothing that can be placed on something. Nor is it something that something can accommodate. It is all nothingness. Nota bene, the abiding duty of a court, vis-a-vis a null act, is to set it aside ex debito justitiae in that it does not exist in law, see Oyeyemi v.Owoeye (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1580) 364. — Ogbuinya JSC.
⦿ A JUDICIAL DECISION THAT GOES AGAINST SEVERAL OTHER CASE LAWS IS NOT A JUST LAW
The decision went against a deluge of other decision of this court on the same point. It is a principle of jurisprudence is that a decision of court which goes against an avalanche of other case law authorities on the same point does not constitute a just decision nor does it amount to good law. This point was made by Oputa, J.S.C. in Onuoha v. State (1989) 1 NSCC 411at 421 (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 23 thus: “…. ‘a just decision of the case’ will be a decision in accord with the many, many authorities and previous decisions of our courts as well as English decisions which our courts have followed and adopted. A decision that throws all our existing authorities to the wind will no doubt be an alarming decision, but hardly a just decision.” Thus, the decision in Benjamin v. Kalio supra did not jurisprudentially constitute good law upon which the court could have relied.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Ogbuinya, J.S.C
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
O. A.Onadele, Esq.
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
B. B. Lawal, Esq., for 2nd Respondent;
A. M. Kayode, Esq., for 3rd Respondent.
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
