➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Chief Harold Sodipo v. Lemminkainen Oy & Anor. (SC.149/1983(-R), Friday, the 12th day of July, 1985)
by Branham Chima Esq.
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Judgement delivered within 3 months;
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
This Ruling deals only with the constitutional issue raised in this appeal. It was raised in ground 8 of the amended grounds of appeal filed with leave of this Court. This said ground reads: ‘The judgment of the High Court is a nullity in that it was delivered on the 13th May, 1980 more than three months after the addresses of counsel on the 11th February, 1980 contrary to section 258(1) of the Constitution and the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal from the said judgment is also therefore a nullity’.
The short facts of the case is that by a specially endorsed writ, respondents claimed N760,556.91 (as debt or money lent or as money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiffs) from the appellants in the High Court of Lagos. There being no affidavit filed by the appellant disclosing a defence to the claim, the respondents moved the court for leave to sign judgment. The application was listed for hearing on 11th February, 1980 when arguments of counsel for both sides were heard. At the conclusion of the hearing, Ruling was reserved till 17th March, 1980 but was not delivered till 27th March, 1980. After delivering the Ruling in which the arguments of counsel were considered, the learned judge, Johnson, J. on his own motion, raised the issue of a possible breach of the Foreign Exchange Control Act and invited counsel to address him on the issue before concluding his Ruling. On 24th April, 1980 counsel for the respondents addressed the court on the issue while counsel for the appellant said he had nothing to say on the issue. The learned judge then adjourned his Ruling to 13th May, 1980 on which date he delivered his final Ruling in which he considered on that issue of a possible breach of the Act before granting the application of counsel for the respondents to sign judgment with N3,000.00 costs. From the first address on 11th February, 1980 to 27th March, 1980, the period was one month sixteen days. From the 11th February, 1980 to 13th May, 1980, the period was three months two days. From 24th April, 1980 to 13th May, 1980, the period amounted to only 19 days.
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether the judgement delivered by the High Court is a nullity?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL DISMISSED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE DELIVERED HIS JUDGEMENT WITHIN THREE MONTHS
‘It is necessary to emphasize that section 258(1) has set down a mandatory three months within which a judge must deliver the judgment. Even if it was only one day beyond the three months when he delivers the judgment, that judgment, will be null and void. However, in the instant appeal that does not arise, for, I am clearly of the view that however one looks at the case, the learned trial judge delivered his judgment within the three months period and was not in breach of section 258(1) of the Constitution. I say so because when he reserved Ruling after the addresses of the 11th February 1980, he delivered his Ruling, based on the case before him as raised by the parties, on 27th March 1980. That was 1 month and 16 days after the final address of 11th February 1980 on the issue before him. The issue before him on that day was whether it was right that judgment be entered in default of defence. He held that there was no defence to the action when he said in his Ruling: “The defendant filed a counter affidavit on the facts deposed to by one Adesuyi Olateru-Olagbegi described as a legal practitioner of 40 Strachan Street, Lagos. Even though the affidavit in support of the plaintiff’s summons clearly showed in paragraph 5 that the deponent verily believes that the defendant has no defence to this action, no attempt whatsoever was made in all the paragraphs of the counter affidavit to put forward any defence to the action. The only material point of dispute taken up in the counter affidavit was that the summons was neither indorsed nor accompanied by the plaintiffs statement of claim. I have already dealt with this point and do not intend to say anything further on it.”
It was after the above Ruling that he himself raised a fresh issue not raised or, apparently, not contemplated by the parties, namely, the issue of illegality of the transaction under the Foreign Exchange Control Act.’
‘That address on 24th April 1980 was, therefore, an address on an entirely new issue raised suo motu by the judge. It was not part of the case presented to Court by either of the parties. After that address the judge reserved his Ruling on the new case to 13th May, 1980 on which date he ruled for the plaintiffs. That was 19 days after that address of 24th April 1980- well within the three months period commanded by section 258(1) of the Constitution. This was one angle of looking at the proceedings.’]
.
.
.
✓ DECISION:
‘I hold that the Ruling of the learned trial Judge, C. A. Johnson, J. (now Chief Judge of Lagos State) dated 13th May 1980 was delivered within the constitutional period stipulated by section 258(1) of the 1979 Constitution and that, accordingly, ground 8 of the Appellant’s amended grounds of appeal dated 8th March 1985 hereby fails.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ WHERE A JUDGE CALLS BACK COUNSEL FOR FURTHER ADDRESS, THE LATTER ADDRESS OVERRIDES AS THE FINAL ADDRESS
A court exists, whether in trials nisi prius or on appeal to get to the root of a matter and if a judge who, in delivering a ruling within the three month period, or who not yet delivering his ruling called back counselor parties for further addresses to explain a point, the latter addresses are the final addresses and time would start to run thenceforth. There could be another circumstance when a judge had adjourned for ruling or judgment, and within the three months, also before he gave his ruling, one or both of the parties or their counsel discover a point upon which they believe they could further assist the court to come to a just decision, and acting upon that pray the court to recall them for further assistance and the court agrees to take further addresses, the latter addresses are the final addresses for the purpose of S.258 and the three month period starts to run thenceforth. To hold otherwise would be to stifle a court and turn the administration of justice into a mechanical but stiff wheel. — Kayode Eso JSC.
- THE FINAL ADDRESS IS THE LAST ADDRESS BEFORE DELIVERY PF DECISION
There is no doubt the word used in section 258(1) is final addresses. It is conceded also that there can only be one final address. But this is my humble opinion as I have already said can only be the address before the delivery of the decision. There can be many addresses with respect to an issue, or in a case. But the final address is the last address before the decision. The period of 3 months can only properly be computed from the date of this address. — Kayode Eso JSC. - A JUDGE IS ENTITLED TO REOPEN CASES IN OTHER TO LEAD TO FULL FACTS
Surely, a judge is entitled to re-open a case as often as he thinks that course will lead, in the end to the full facts, be uncovered so that justice should thus be done: see Onyeama Ezenwa v. 5.1. Mazeli & ors. 15 WACA. 67 at p. 69. The essential function of all courts is to discover the truth in order to do justice to the parties before them. — Oputa JSC.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
N. Aniagolu, J.S.C.
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
Mr. H. A. Lardner, S.A.N.
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
Mr. K. Sofola, S.A.N.
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
Section 258(1) of the Constitution, 1979, relevant for our purposes in this judgment, provides that “(1) Every court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than 3 months after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses”.
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
