➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Pastor Ize-Iyamu Osagie Andrew & Anor. v. Independent National Electoral & Ors. (SC.466/2017, Monday 24th July 2017)
by Branham Chima Esq.
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Impugning the record of appeal;
Dumping of documents;
Hearsay evidence;
Polling unit accounting of votes;
Voters’ register.
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
This interlocutory appeal is against the ruling of the Court of Appeal, Benin Division delivered on 30th May, 2017 wherein the lower court refused the appellants’ application dated and filed on 22nd May, 2017 seeking an order correcting and/or amending the 1st appellant’s evidence-in-chief contained in Volume 13, pages 11742 – 11743 of the record of appeal and to rely on the record of the 1st appellant’s evidence-in-chief taken by one of the members of the Tribunal’s panel Hon. Justice Gilbert A. Ngele (member 1), as well as a deeming order.
On 28th September, 2016, election into the office of Governor of Edo State was conducted by the 1st respondent. The 1st appellant contested the said election on the platform of the 2nd appellant, whilst the 2nd respondent was sponsored by the 3rd respondent. At the end of the election, the 1st respondent declared the 2nd respondent as the winner of the election and consequently returned him as the duly elected Governor of Edo State. Dissatisfied with the declaration and return of the 2nd respondent as the A Governor of Edo State, the appellants, on 19th October, 2016 filed a petition at the Governorship Election Tribunal, holden at Benin City challenging the aforesaid return. After due consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the tribunal on 14th April, 2017 delivered judgment and dismissed the petition. Not satisfied with the decision of the Tribunal, the appellants appealed to the lower court vide notice of appeal filed on the 28th of April, 2017.
After parties had exchanged briefs of argument, but before the hearing of the appeal, the appellants filed a motion on 22nd May, 2017, seeking to correct and/or amend 1 st appellant’s evidence-in-chief aforesaid. The said motion was argued on 30th May, 2017 and ruling given the same date. The application was refused and dismissed.
ALSO,
At the end of hearing the appeal, the lower court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Trial Tribunal. Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeal, the appellants have further appealed to this court.
[FOR THE RULING ON THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, SEE ‘FURTHER DICTA’ BELOW]
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether the court below was right in affirming the decision of the Tribunal which dismissed the appellants’ case before the F respondents’ defence, misplaced the burden of proof on the appellants, misdirected itself regarding the nature of appellants’ 2nd issue for determination before the Tribunal and thereby caused a grave miscarriage of justice on the appellants?
II. Whether the court below was right by holding that the testimonies of all the witnesses called by the appellants were hearsay evidence and unreliable while preferring and relying on the non-cogent, unbelievable and wooly testimonies of the 2nd and 3rd respondents’ witnesses and in further holding that the appellants dumped documents tendered by them by failure to link all the documents tendered by them to their case when this was not so?
III. Whether the court below was not wrong in its view that the h appellants needed to call polling agents from all the polling units challenged in order to prove lack of improper accreditation, over voting, improper accounting of ballot papers when the proof of the allegations is documentary and in further holding that the 1st respondent did not abandon its pleadings by failure to call or elicit any evidence in support of same?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL DISMISSED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[A PETITIONER WHO HAS NOT LED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS CASE PLACED ON THE IMAGINARY SCALE
‘Section 136 of the Evidence Act 2011, the onus is on the plaintiffs or appellants to establish first their case by credible, cogent and admissible evidence or persuasive arguments. It is after the plaintiff’s or appellants as the case may be have established or proved their case that the onus would shift to the respondents to rebut the case of the plaintiff or appellant already established. See Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1 at 222. Thus, the case of Mbanefo v. Molokwu (supra) supports the decision of the lower court that a petitioner who has not led credible evidence in support of his case is not entitled to have his case placed on the imaginary scale of justice since it would be illogical to place nothing on something. As was rightly argued by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent the appellants have not contended that the onus of proof did not lie on them and having not discharged same, the case of Mbanefo (supra) supports that the Tribunal can at that stage conclude on the ultimate effect of the appellants’ case, that there was no need for the respondents to enter a defence which they nonetheless, out of abundance of caution, entered.’
‘One important issue which has to be noted in this case is that the reliefs sought by the appellants at the trial court are declaratory. It is trite that a party & who seeks declaratory reliefs is duty bound to succeed only on the strength of his case without making recourse to the respondent’s case. I am fully persuaded to hold that the court below rightly endorsed the decision of the trial Tribunal which considered the appellants” case first and found it to be incredible before considering the respondents’ defence which was done out of abundance of caution. I do not agree with the appellants in their contention that the Tribunal dismissed their case before considering that of the respondents since what the Tribunal did was to evaluate the appellants” evidence and found them incredible with the ultimate effect and consequence that there was no need for the respondents to even enter a defence.’]
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↪️ ISSUE 2: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[TESTIMONY OF THE PW1 AND WARD COLLATION OFFICERS ARE HEARSAY
‘I agree entirely with the two courts below that in the instant case, the evidence of PW1 and all the ward collation officers who testified in this case are hearsay … The appellants have admitted in their brief that the evidence of their witnesses did not arise from what they witnessed on election day when the entries in the electoral forms were being made, but (as contained in para. 6.09 page 28 of their brief), from “findings” which they “came up with” after observing and drawing inferences from the electoral forms. If the appellants’ witnesses evidence were not to prove the truth in those documents, why was it necessary for them to give evidence on them after “studying”, “making findings” and “coming up with” their evidence. I do not agree with the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. Again, if their evidence was not to prove the truth on those documents tendered through the Bar, how was the trial Tribunal to believe those figures and numbers which were the fulcrum of the petition without subjecting them to cross examination of the actual makers of the documents? It has to be noted that those witnesses did not take part or participate in the conduct of the election nor were they present at any of the stages at which the electoral forms, documents or materials which formed the basis of their evidence were recorded, prepared or entries thereon made. See Amosun v. INEC (2010) LPELR 49431 at 120121; Okereke v. Umahi (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1524) 438 at 473 … As was rightly in my opinion submitted by Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN, in an election matter such as the instant case, the evidence required is not the one which was picked up from perusing documents made by others. Otherwise, anyone with basic comprehension arithmetic skills would be able to testify anywhere in Nigeria. The requirement of the law is that a petitioner must call eye witnesses who were present when the entries in the forms were being made and can testify to how the entries in the documents were arrived at. It is to he noted that the appellants’ witnesses were not the makers of the documents in respect of which they testified and were not present when the documents were made. They were thus, not competent and/or capable of giving testimonies and explain the circumstances surrounding how the entries in the electoral document were made.’.
THE EXHIBITS WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED IN OPEN COURT BUT DUMPED ON THE COURT BY THE APPELLANT
‘On issue of dumping documents on the Tribunal, both the Tribunal and the court below are in concurrence that the appellants dumped their documents (Exhibits) on the tribunal. The court below said this much on page 13018 of the record of appeal (Vol. 14) as follows:
“What the law requires is that first of all, the maker of the document must tender it and testify to its contents. Then, the documents must be subjected to the test of veracity and credibility and where it involves mathematical calculations, how the figures were arrived at must be demonstrated in the open court and finally, the correctness of the final figure must also be shown in the open court. What the appellants did here was to dump the documents on the court by tendering it from the Bar, got a few witnesses to identify or recognize some of the documents and left the Tribunal to figure out the rest in its chambers “….. It is not the duty of the court to sort out the various exhibits, the figures and do calculations in chambers to arrive at a figure to be given in judgment particularly in an election petition which is challenging the number of valid votes scored by a candidate declared and returned as the winner of the election.” Without much ado, I agree with the view expressed by the court below in this matter. Both the trial tribunal and the lower court have stated clearly in their judgments that the slated exhibits were not demonstrated in the open court by the appellants and their witnesses. My attention has not been drawn to any part of the record showing the contrary state of affairs at the trial. So, believe the views of the two courts below to be the true position.’
‘From the record of appeal, almost all the documents tendered by the appellants were tendered, by their counsel from the Bar. Hence the decision of the Tribunal as upheld by the court below … cannot be faulted. The serious lacuna the appellants’ case is their failure link the said documents to the relevant aspects or weir case by calling the appropriate witnesses to speak to them and demonstrate their applicability to appellants’ case in open court. The law is clear on duty of a party tendering documents to ensure what such document qua exhibits are linked to the relevant aspects of his case to which they relate. See Ladoja v. Ajimobi (supra), Audu v. INEC (No. 2) (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt 1212) 456. Uclw v. £7vcW (2.012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 330 at 360.’]
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↪️ ISSUE 3: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENT AND ASCRIPTION OF VALUE ARE TWO DIFFERENT THINGS
‘A careful perusal of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants in respect of the above three sub-issues, will disclose that they are mere repetition of aspects of issues 1 and 2 already treated in this judgment. There is no double that allegations of lack of accreditation/improper accreditation, over voting, inaccurate ballot papers account can be established by documentary evidence. This can be done by examination of voter’s registers and Form EC 8As used for the conduct of the relevant election. The grouse of the appellants is however the holding of the lower court that “both documents and the witness who saw, heard, perceived or did what amounts to non-compliance are vital for contesting the lawfulness of the votes cast at the election, ” relying on the cases Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1. Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87 at 159. I wish to state at the risk of repetition that the fact that a document is necessary to prove accreditation, over voting etc and has been admitted in evidence from the bar or however, does not necessarily mean that it must be automatically attached or accorded probative value or weight. The admissibility of a document and the evidential value ascribed to it are two different things. See Agballah v. Chime (2009) 1 NWLR. (Pt. 1 122) 373, Nyesom v. Peterside (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1512) 452 at 522 523. May I state for the umpteenth time that tendering of documents without adducing evidence, which link the document with the particular complaint of the party is fatal. This is because, it is not the duty of the court/Tribunal to examine the documents outside the Tribunal and tie them with the complaints of the appellants. In Belgore v Ahmed (supra), this court emphasized the fact that where the maker of a document is not called to testify, the document would not be accorded probative value, notwithstanding its status as a certified public document.’
THE LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR TICKING OF VOTERS’ REGISTER
‘The above provision of the Electoral Act requires a Presiding Officer, on being presented with a voter’s card by an intending voter, to be satisfied that the name of the person is on the Register of Voters, issue him a ballot paper and indicate F on the Register that the person has voted. There is no provision for double tick to the right and left as argued by the appellants. Again, the supplement to the 2015 Guidelines and Regulations for the Conduct of the Flection (tendered as Exhibit 1R022) which modified the portions of the Guidelines refilling to accreditation states that accreditation at the election was to be by “authentication and verification of voters using the card reader, checking or the Register of Voters and inking of the cuticle of the specified finger. From the above provision it is evident that from the steps outlined therein, there is no mention of licking of voter’s register on any side. Where the statute has mo provided for ticking to the right and to the left, no rule of interpretation should be employed to stretch the law beyond what it provides just to meet the selfish interest of either the appellant or respondent. The law is well settled that where the wordings of a statute or an enactment are clear and unambiguous, the same should be given its direct and ordinary meaning by the courts without employing any rule of interpretation. See Calabar Central Co-Operative Thrift & Credit Society Ltd & 20 Ors v. Bassey Ebong Ekpo (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt, 1083) 362. Atungwu v. Ochekwu (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1375) 605, Amodi v. INEC (2013) 4 NWLR(Pt. 1345) 595, Ugwianyi v. NICON Ins. Plc. (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) 546.’
ONLY AGENTS PRESENT AT THE POLLING UNITS CAN GIVE EVIDENCE OF IMPROPER COUNTING
‘On the issue of inaccurate accounting of ballot papers at the polling units, I state emphatically that only the agents who were present at the polling units where the appellants allege the noncompliance took place, that can give testimony of such ballot Inaccurate accounting. The reason is that it is at the polling units that accreditation and distribution of ballot papers to voters take place any ballot papers not used at the election, together with used ones, whether valid or invalid are usually accounted for at the polling units. It stands to reason that only persons who were physically present at the polling units who could give evidence as to what transpired there. They apparently failed to bring such category of witnesses to testify as I have held before, this is the bane of appellants’ case. See Oke v. Mimiko (supra).’
‘As was held by the two courts below, the ballot papers not having been tender and admitted in evidence by the trial tribunal, it was therefore not available and was not evidence with the trial tribunal or parties could rely on. The appellants as, it turns out, could not persuade this court in this aspect of their argument.’]
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✓ DECISION:
‘Having resolved the three issues against the appellants, what remains to be said is that this appeal is devoid of any scintilla of merit and is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs. The above are the reasons why I dismissed this appeal on Monday, the 10th day of July, 2017.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL IS NOT SPENT DESPITE APPEAL BEING DECIDED AT THE LOWER COURT BELOW BECAUSE THE MAIN APPEAL IS STILL IN THIS COURT
The case of Nwora v. Nwabueze (supra) relied upon by the 3rd respondent in which this court held that an interlocutory appeal cannot be entertained in this court where the main appeal at the lower court has been struck out is not applicable to the facts of this case. Every case is authority for what it decides. In Nwora’s case (supra), there was no record of appeal from the trial High Court to the Court of Appeal which necessitated the striking out of the appeal for noncompliance with conditions of appeal. In the instant appeal, although the appeal has been decided at the court below, the record of appeal sought to be amended is still relevant to the appellant’s case before this court. Therefore, it cannot be said to be academic and/or spent as argued by Senior Counsel for the 3rd respondent. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ TECHNICALITY IS A HARMLESS ERROR
The word technicality has been defined by this court to mean a harmless error and I think this is what the use of the word “impliedly” connotes. See Mrs. Simian Olapeju Sinmisola Olley v. Hon. Olukolu Ganiyu Tunji & Ors(2013) 10 NWLR(Pt. 1362) 275. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ THE NOTES KEPT BY OTHER MEMBERS OF AN ELECTION TRIBUNAL ARE PERSONAL TO THEM
By Section 285 (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), “the quorum of an election tribunal established under this section shall be the Chairman and one other member:” This provision clearly sets the chairman of an Election Tribunal as playing a very prominent role. Without him, the panel is not properly constituted. His position, as was pointed out by the learned’ senior counsel for the 2nd respondent of the proceedings of an Election Tribunal. It follows without much ado that the record of proceeding kept by the said chairman is the authentic record of the court.lt cannot be otherwise since the record of appeal only takes cognizance of the record as kept by the Chairman. The notes kept by other members are just personal to them. As was pointed out by the court of Appeal in Ngige v. Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1, should all the notes of all the member be made part of the record, apart from being cumbersome, it will lead to confusion at the hearing of an appeal. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ NOTES TAKEN BY OTHER MEMBER OF THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL CANNOT QUALIFY AS EVIDENCE-IN-CHIEF
On page 12937, Vol. 14 of the record of appeal, the court below followed their earlier decision in Ngige’s case (supra) and held that “where more than one judge sits as in a panel in this case under consideration, the record of the Chairman taken at the proceedings is the record of the Tribunal”. Thus, an attempt by the appellants to move the lower court to substitute the record of the Chairman of the Tribunal with that of member I of the panel was an exercise in A futility. No wonder the lower court refused the application. More so, by paragraph 41 (3) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), relating to the taking of evidence-in-chief in an election petition proceedings, “there shall be no oral examination of a witness during his evidence-in-chief except to lead the witness to adopt his written deposition and tender in evidence all disputed documents or other exhibits referred to in his deposition.” In an election petition proceedings, the above provision makes it crystal clear that evidence-in-chief of a witness is his witness statement on oath which he is only permitted to adopt and nothing more. After adoption, the said witness statement on oath becomes his evidence-in-chief. The only other aspect of what will constitute part of the record and/or evidence is his answers to questions during cross-examination. It follows that anything other than the adoption of his witness statement on oath during examination in chief, the notes taken by member 1 or any other member sought to replace the Chairman’s record, cannot by any stretch of imagination qualify as his evidence-in-chief and the court below was perfectly right to refuse the application. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ WHAT A PARTY SEEKING TO IMPUGN THE RECORD OF COURT MUST DO
This court has laid down the procedure to be followed where a party seeks to impugn the record of a court. Such a party must first file an affidavit challenging the record and serve same on the chairman of the tribunal. The said affidavit must be independent of the motion to be filed to amend the record which motion shall be between the parties to the action only. After filing the said affidavit, it will be followed by a motion on notice setting out the prayers and particulars thereof. The court will then exercise its discretion whether to grant the application or not. See Garuba v. Omokhodion (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1269) 145. For the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, a party seeking to impugn the record of a court or Tribunal must do the following:
- File an affidavit challenging the record
- File a formal application (motion on notice) to the court supported by an affidavit. Note that the later affidavit can’t be the same as an affidavit challenging the record. The affidavit in support must disclose the following particulars:
- That affidavit challenging the record was duly filed.
- That the said affidavit was duly served on the affected parties with the particulars of service disclosed.
- That the affected parties either: (a) Filed affidavit in response to the affidavit challenging the record; or (b) Failed to file such affidavit.
It is after the above steps have been complied with that the court to which the application is made can exercise its discretion one way or the other. The appellants herein failed to follow these steps. I hold that the court below was right to decide that the application was incompetent though it nonetheless determined the motion on the merit due largely, in my opinion, to the public interest and perception in election matters. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ REPLY BRIEF CANNOT BE USED TO RAISE AN OBJECTION
In the appellants’ reply brief of argument, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the respondent’s brief of argument is incompetent because the arguments therein are against the decision of the Election Tribunal and not the court below. He urged this court to hold that the first respondent has no proper brief before this court.
Without much ado, may I state that the function of a reply brief does not include the raising of objection to the usage of a brief of the respondent duly adopted and relied upon by a respondent. The simple reason being that the respondent at that stage is not procedurally enamored to file a reply to the appellant’s reply brief, it goes without saying that such objection would be raised without giving the respondent an opportunity to be heard on it. As it turn out in this case, only the complaint of the appellant regarding the brief of the 1 st respondent is before this court without a proper avenue for the respondent to state his own side of the case for the court to take an informed and unbiased position. A reply brief, I must say, is to respond to new issues raised by the respondent in his brief. It is not an opportunity to reargue appellant’s case or even improve on it. Where a reply brief goes outside the parameters set for it, the court should ignore and discountenance it. See Umeji A Ors v. A.-G., Imo State (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) 552. In the instant case, (hat part of the appellants’ reply brief is hereby discountenanced. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ EVERY REFORMULATED ISSUE BY THE COURT MUST BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVEALING THE REAL GRIEVANCE
The issues so formulated by the Tribunal or court must be with the view to bringing the real question in controversy in the mailer to the front burner. Put differently, any modified or reformulated issue must be for the purpose only of determining the real grievances of the parties to the case. See INEC v. Abubakar (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1143) 259 at 277 278 paras. G A, Daniel v. INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt, 1463) 113 at 146 … May I add my voice to the position already established by this court that no court should take the liberty of reformulating issues as to change the nature and character of the case submitted by the parties or indirectly raise a completely new issue. See Ehmola v. C.B.N. (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 224 at 265 266 paras. G D. This, however, is not the case here. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ GIVING EVIDENCE THAT A STATEMENT WAS MADE AND NOT THAT THE STATEMENT MADE IS TRUE IS NOT HEARSAY
Section 37 of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides: 37. Hearsay means a statement- (a) Oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding: or (b) Contained or recorded in a book, document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of this Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter staled in it.” From the above statutory definition of hearsay evidence, it is gleaned that 2 it is a statement made by a person who is not a witness in a proceeding, or contained/recorded in a book which by the provision of the Evidence Act is rendered inadmissible. It is also hearsay if it is offered in proof of the truth of the statement. See Subramarian v. Public Prosecutor (1956) 1 WLR 965 at 969. As was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, and I agree with him, where a piece of evidence being a statement (whether oral or written) made by a person who is not called as a witness in a proceeding is offered in proof of the fact that the statement was made and not in proof of the fact that the statement is true, that piece of evidence cannot be classified as hearsay. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ HEARSAY ON PUBLIC DOCUMENTS – TRYING TO ASSERT TRUTH OF THE CONTENTS IS HEARSAY WHERE NOT THE MAKER
On the above submission and I think I had put the facts and the law in proper perspective earlier in this judgment that where a public document is tendered just to show the existence of such document only, though not tendered by the maker, it would not ordinarily be termed hearsay. But where a witness who did not participate in the making of the document ventures to give evidence on the contents of the document and tries to persuade the court on the truth of its content was done in this case. It becomes hearsay and torn of exceptions granted by Section 52 of the Evidence Act. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ TENDERING BULK DOCUMENTS IN COURT – DUMPING OF DOCUMENT
Let me lend my voice to the trite position of the law which has been expounded in this court severally that tendering documents in bulk in election petition is to ensure speedy trial and hearing of election petitions within the time limited by statute. But that does not exclude or stop proper evidence to prop such dormant documents. As this court stated in A.C.N v. Lamido (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1305) 560 at 592, paras. C F, it is not the duty of a court or Tribunal to embarks on cloistered justice by making enquiry into the case outside the open court not even by examination of documents which were in evidence but not examined in the open court. A judge is an adjudicator, not an investigator. I need to stale clearly that demonstration in open court is not achieved where a witness simply touches a bundle of numerous documents with numerous pages.
The frontloading evidence and tendering documents in bulk from the bar do not alter this requirement which is an element of proof. See Ogboru v. Okowa (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1522) 84. Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1182)205. — Okoro JSC.
⦿ MANUALS AND GUIDELINES FOR ELECTIONS ARE NOT GROUNDS FOR QUESTIONING THE ELECTION
Let me state that Manuals, Guidelines and Regulations made by the Electoral Body in aid of smooth conduct of election are to be observed by both ad-hoc and permanent staff of INEC for the good of the electoral process. But can such directions take the place of the Electoral Act? The answer is No. Section 138(2) of the Electoral Act. 2010 (as amended) states: “138(2) An act or omission which may be contrary to an instruction or directive of the Commission or of an Officer appointed for the purpose of the election but which is not contrary to the provisions of this Act shall not of itself he a ground for questioning the election.” — Okoro JSC.
⦿ A PERSON WHO DID NOT MAKE A DOCUMENT IS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE EVIDENCE ON IT
The law is settled that a person who did not make a document is not in a position to give evidence on it because the veracity and credibility of a document cannot be tested through a person who has no nexus with the documents. — Kekere-Ekun JSC.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Okoro, J.S.C.
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
Yusuf Ali, SAN.
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
Dr Onyechi Ikpeazu, SAN, being led by Asiwaju A. S. Awomolo, SAN, for 1st Respondent;
Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN, for 2nd Respondent;
Prince Lateef O. Fagbemi, SAN, for 3rd Respondent;
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
