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Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) V. Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) & ORS (2011)

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➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) V. Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) & ORS (2011)

by Branham Chima (LL.B.)

➥ ISSUES RAISED
Computation of time;
Interpretation of section 285(7) of the Constitution.

➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
It is not in contest that the Presidential Election was conducted on 16th April, 2011 through out the country. The 1st and the 2nd appellants in SC.276/2011 who were the candidates of the appellant in SC. 272/2011 were declared as winners and returned by INEC accordingly. The 1st respondent in SC.272/2011 felt dissatisfied and filed their petition at the court of Appeal on a Sunday in May, 2011. The appellants challenged the competence of the petition for the above stated reason at the Court of Appeal sitting in its first instance as a presidential Electoral Petition Court. It was duly addressed by learned Senior Counsel for the parties on the salient point. In its considered Ruling handed out on 14th July, 2011, it over ruled the preliminary objection taken and found that the petition was competent. Both appellants filed their appeals before this court within time. Parties duly filed their respective briefs of argument just before this court went on annual vacation in July, 2011. When this appeal was called for hearing on 27th October, 2011, the 60 days mandated by the provision of section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, had passed. This court then requested counsel to the parties to proffer address on the effect of same on the two appeals.

➥ ISSUE(S) & RESOLUTION(S)
[APPEAL STRUCK OUT]

↪️ I. Whether public holidays, Saturday, and Sunday, ought to be excluded when computing the 60 days as in section 285(7) of the Constitution?

RESOLUTION:
[THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THE EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC HOLIDAY, SATURDAY, AND/OR SUNDAY
‘I have read over and over the provisions of Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and have found the words used therein to be clear, unambiguous and simple and straight forward. I therefore hold that the words used herein are not subject to any interpretation at all they are to be given their natural meanings; that the natural meanings of the words are that appeals from a decision of an election tribunal or the Court of Appeal in an election matter shall be heard and determined within sixty (60) days from the date the judgment/decision appealed against was delivered, by the tribunal or Court of Appeal. It is clear that by the use of the word “shall” in Section 285(7) in section of the 1999 constitution the framers of the constitution meant to make and did make the provision mandatory as it admits of no discretion whatsoever. It means that the sixty (60) days allotted in Section 285(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) cannot be extended even for one second as the decision of the appellate court must be rendered “within” sixty (60) days of the delivery of the judgment on appeal. It is my further opinion that the sixty (60) days allotted in section 285(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) includes Saturdays, Sundays and Public holidays as well as court vacations because if it was the intention of the framers of the constitution to exclude these days they would have so stated in clear and unambiguous terms. The only exception may be where the last day of the sixty (60) days happens to be Sunday or a public holiday then the action contemplated in section 285(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) can be completed on the next working day – as settled by a long line of authorities.’

Available:  Ndukwe v LPDC [2007] - SC

‘The absurdity in not applying the natural and plain meaning of the words in section 285(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) can be seen in the computation by learned senior counsel, Chief Gadzama, SAN, which makes an appeal against the decision delivered on 14th July, 2011 to remain valid up to 14th December, 2011. Would that not defeat the purpose of the provision which is clearly aimed at curtailing the inordinate delays arising from election matters where some learned counsel engaged in delay tactics resulting in long delays in the hearing and conclusion of election matters to the embarrassment, not only of the legal profession in particular but, the nation in general. The intention of the drafters of the constitution being to stop the practice of unnecessary delays in election matters; it is our duty to ensure compliance with the law by doing what is needed within the time frame. It may be difficult, in fact it is very difficult but it is a sacrifice we all must make in the interest of our democracy until our politicians learn to accept the verdict of the people as expressed through the ballot box.’]
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.
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✓ DECISION:
‘In conclusion, I hold the view that the consolidated appeal Nos. SC/272/2011 and SC/276/2011 having arisen from a decision of the lower court delivered on the 14th day of July, 2011 have lapsed by the 27th day of October, 2011 when senior counsel for the appellants sought leave of court to adjourn them to abide the judgment of the lower court on the substantive petition and consequently incompetent. The appeals are no longer alive to be adjourned. They have died by effusion of the sixty (60) days allotted by Section 285(7) of the 1999 constitution (as amended) and are hereby struck out. Parties to bear their costs.’

Available:  A.G Ondo State v. A.G Federation & Ors (2002)

➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ WHERE WORDS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE CLEAR, THERE IS NOTHING TO INTERPRETE
It is settled law that in interpreting a constitutional provision the court should adopt a broad approach to the process. Also settled is the principle that where the words of the constitution or statute are plain, clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural, ordinary meanings as there is nothing, in effect to be interpreted. In that case, the words must be given their plain/natural meanings, as there is nothing to interpret. — W.S.N. Onnoghen JSC.

Available:  Alhaji Baba Berende v. Alhaja Sahara Abdulkadir Usman & Anor (2004)

⦿ THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE SUPREME TO ANY OTHER LAW
It is also settled law that the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are supreme and have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that any other law which is inconsistent with its provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency as the constitutional provision must prevail over such Act/law. — W.S.N. Onnoghen JSC.

➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen, JSC

➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
Chief Gadzama, SAN.
Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN.

⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
Dipo Okpeseyi, SAN.
Ben Osaka Esq.

➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
Section 285(7) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides as follows:- “An appeal from a decision of an election tribunal or Court of Appeal in an election matter shall be heard and disposed of within sixty (60) days from the date of the delivery of judgment of the tribunal or Court of Appeal.”

➥ REFERENCED (CASE)

➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)

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